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ABSTRACT

Reexamination was created to reconfirm the presumed validity of a patent without
requiring the patentee to endure the expense of litigation. The Patent Act allows
anyone to request reexamination of a patent based on newly discovered prior art.
Upon finding that the request raises a substantial new question of patentability, the
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office may order reexamination.
Even if a request is not made, the Director may sua sponte order a reexamination.
Such reexaminations are only initiated when questions of public policy arise and
there is no interest by any other person. However, in practice, the decision to order
reexamination is made by officials other than the Director based upon public outcry
under a different standard than set forth in Title 35.
This practice forces
independent inventors into a reexamination that may take many years to complete
and results in claims being invalidated or revised. Two recent reexaminations of
high profile patents have created controversy among patent practitioners. The
reexaminations were ordered after an independent or small entity inventor received
a substantial judgment against a large company. In both cases, the Director sua
sponte ordered an exparte reexamination while the judicial proceedings of the case
were still ongoing.
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WHEN POLITICS INTERFERE WITH PATENT REEXAMINATION
AMY L. MAGAS*

A patent should function as a leveler whereby an individual or small
company may be able to hold his or its rights of property against the
pressure of the strongest adversary. It should have a protective character
like that of a high powered rifle in the hands of a puny man beset by a
wildly charging bull elephant.1

INTRODUCTION
2
The Supreme Court has stated that patent law achieves three goals: (1)
rewarding invention; (2) stimulating further innovation by promoting the disclosure
of inventions; and (3) assuring that ideas in the public domain remain there through
the stringent requirements of the patenting process.3 In exchange for disclosure of
his invention, the inventor is rewarded with a time-limited right to exclude others
from making, using, selling, offering to sell or importing the patented invention in
the United States. 4 The high cost of patenting and litigation to protect the rights in
that patent creates a chilling effect on the ability of independent inventors to seek
patents even when those inventors repeatedly demonstrate their ability to
successfully innovate and develop new products. 5 The patenting process is expensive
due to high United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") fees and costs
associated with patent prosecution. 6 Furthermore, the average patent litigation costs

* J.D. Candidate I.P., January 2005, The John Marshall Law School, B.S. Mechanical
Engineering, Iowa State University, 1999. The author would like to thank the staff of The John
Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for their editorial assistance, especially Joanna
Gunderson, Dan Lechleiter, Bob Barz, Erin Fox, John Gabala, Larry Kasoff, Todd Rinner, and
Sherry Rollo. The author would also like to thank Rhea Ramsey for her research assistance.
1 Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 9 (1992)
(quoting United States Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner Conway Coe's testimony at the
Temporary National Economic Committee Hearings in 1939).
2 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
3 See generally, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2000) (setting forth the numerous
requirements an inventor must meet to obtain a patent).
1 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1 (2004); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 14 (Aspen 2003) (explaining that similar to the rights of a property
owner to prevent others from entering his land, a patent owner can prevent others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell or importing his invention into this country without his express
authorization).
See generally, MUELLER, supra note 5, at 377 (patent prosecution is the time consuming and
costly process of obtaining a patent, which involves filing an application with the USPTO and then
responding to any rejections or objections made by the agency as well as paying appropriate fees).
( See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1., at 4 (1980), reprintodin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463 (the
cost of patent litigation is an impossible burden for inventors); see also AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW
AsS'N, 2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (setting forth average costs of litigation); FY2005
Fee Schedule, USPTO (Oct. 2, 2004), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2004octl.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter FY2005 Fee Schedule] (for an example of a current USPTO fee
schedule).
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around one million dollars.7 In addition, there are some who contend that a patent is
worthless if it is not commercialized. 8 Thus, some inventors opt for trade secret
protection. Such protection, while less costly, is easily lost and does not benefit the
public.9
Independent and small entity10 inventors may not have the financial resources
to defend and enforce a patent. Therefore, alternative enforcement and defense
mechanisms, such as granting an exclusive license to a licensing firm or patent
reexamination, must be used. 1 Granting an exclusive license to a licensing firm
provides an independent or small entity inventor with business, technical and legal
resources that would not be available such an inventor enforced and defended the
12
patent on its own.

7 Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: StrategicApplieations ofReexamination Versus an Aggressive
Adversary (PartI), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 471, 495 n.9 (2002) (proposing patent
reexamination as a solution to the scenario of an independent or small entity inventor being
threatened with patent infringement by an aggressive larger company). In suits with less than $1
million at stake, the median costs per party through discovery and trial is $290 thousand and $500
thousand, respectively. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, 2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22.
In suits where there is $1 million to $25 million at stake, the median costs per party through
discovery and trial is $1 million and $2 million, respectively. Id. In suits were there is more than
$25 million at stake, the median costs per party through discovery and trial is $2.5 million and $4
million, respectively. Id.
8 Mueller, supra note 5, at 14 (patent rights are negative rights, in other words the patentee
receives the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention); see
also Andy Gibbs, Your Patent Is
Worthless!, PAT. CAFE MAG. (Nov. 1, 1998), at
http://www.cafezine.com/printable template.asp?deptid= 19&articleid= 156 (last visited Nov. 9, 2004)
(arguing that only three to five out of one hundred inventors will ever succeed in commercializing
their patent).
9 Protecting trade secrets serves two basic functions: providing a means to preserve standards
of commercial ethics and encouraging innovation.
Eric S. Tautfest, Temptations to Take:
Misappropriationof Trade Secrets, Damages and Remedies, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 117, 117
(2003). In contrast to patents or copyrights, trade secret protection has no statutory limitation and
can, conceivably, continue forever. Id. Whereas patent or copyright protection extends only to
certain types of materials or information, trade secret protection extends to a wide range of
information. In addition, trade secrets are not publicly disclosed; with patents, the entire patent file
and its contents become public property; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.211(a) (2004) (unless express written
notice is given, patent applications are published eighteen months after the patent application is
filed).
10In this paper, "small" is used to depict patenting entities such as independent inventors or
small-sized businesses, referred to in the USPTO as "small entities." 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2004).
Generally, a client is a small entity if the client has fewer than 500 employees; see James Goepel,
Small Businesses Aren't Always Small Entities at the USPTO, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (May 2003),
available at http://www.iptoday.com/may03/goepel.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2004). Establishment of
small entity status allows the payment of certain reduced patent fees. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2000).
11David Lux & Marcia L. Rorke et al., From Invention to Innovation.*Commercialization of
New Technology by Independent and Small Business Inventors, Department of Energy 6, MOHAWK
RESEARCH CORP., (1991), available at http://www.eere.energy.gov/inventions/docs/fromi2i.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004) (explaining that there are two ways to commercialize, either license the patent
to someone who can make and/or sell it or do it yourself).
12 Small entity status is generally not affected unless the licensing firm has more than 500
employees. See 13 C.F.R § 121.802 (2004) (defining what constitutes a small business to be one with
no more than 500 employees and no standing interest in or by a company of the same).
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Reexamination provides a low-cost 13 alternative to litigation because it confirms
the presumed validity of the patent over the prior art which is the basis for the
reexamination. 14 Reexamination allows anyone to request review of an issued patent
in light of prior art 15 cited by the requester. 16 In addition, the Director 17 of the
USPTO is given the power to sua sponte order an ex parte18 reexamination based
upon the standards set forth by Congress and the USPTO.1 9 In practice, however,
the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") notes that other USPTO
20
officials actually order the sua sponte reexaminations.
13 Compare FY2005 Fee Schedule, supra note 6 (listing fees for various USPTO procedures
such as the fee for an exparte patent reexamination as $2,520), and Am.INTELL. PROP. LAW ASSN,
2003 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 20 (showing median prosecution fees for an original patent
application in the USPTO to be around $9000 and median prosecution fees for an amendment to be
about $2000), with Leung, supra note 7, at 495 n.9 (stating that the average patent litigation costs
about $1 million).
14 11 DONALD S. CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07 [4] (2004). The function of reexamination is to
reevaluate those patents that are issued by the USPTO and thereafter the validity is found to be
questionable, thus, the process improves the reliability of the patent system; see In re Etter, 756
F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15 Prior art constitutes
references which may be used to determine the novelty and
nonobviousness of claimed subject matter in a patent application or patent. 1 Chisum on Patents,
Scope (2004). It includes both documentary sources (patents and publications from anywhere in the
world) and non-documentary sources (things known, used or invented in the United States). Id. A
reference must be within the art pertinent to the invention in question or an analogous art. Id. In
addition, a reference must be dated prior to the applicant's date of invention or, in the case of
statutory bars, more than one year prior to his date of application for a patent. Id.
16 Id. At the completion of a reexamination, the USPTO issues a reexamination certificate that
becomes part of the official patent document. 35 U.S.C. § 307 (2000). This certificate serves three
purposes: (1)to cancel a claim determined to be unpatentable; (2) to confirm a claim determined to
be patentable; or (3) to incorporate any proposed amended claims or new claims determined to be
patentable; see MUELLER, supra note 5, at 215.
17 On March 29, 2000, the title of the head of the USPTO was changed from "commissioner' to
"director." Sabra Chartrand, What's in a Name? A Sign of Other Changes at the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at C6. The Director of the USPTO is
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2000). In
order to be appointed, the proposed Director must be a professional with a background and
experience in patent or trademark law. Id. The Director is responsible for policy direction and
management of the USPTO as well as for the issuance of patents and the registration of
trademarks. Id. § 3(a)(2)(A).
18 As the name implies, the ex parto reexamination proceedings are generally conducted "ex
parte" which means the third party requester is not involved in the proceeding after the initial time
period required for the patent owner to file a statement related the declaration of the reexamination.
35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000).
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2004). The prior art used in an ex parte
reexamination request is typically in the form of patents or printed publications. 35 U.S.C. § 301.
See generally, Pat.Reexam. and Small Bus. Innovation:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet,and Intel. Prop. of the Comm. on the JudieiaryHouse ofRepresentatives, 107th Cong.
44 (2002) (prepared statement of Nancy J. Linck, Senior Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Sec'y,
Guilford Pharmals, Inc.) [hereinafter Patent Reexam. Hearings]; James D. Myers & Robert W.
Glatz, Strengthening and Weakening the Patent Through Reexamination and Reissue, Presented at
the Practicing L. Inst. Pat. Litig. Seminar, Atlanta, GA (Oct. 23, 1997), available at
http://www.myersbigel.com/pat-articles/pat-article 11.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
20 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2239 (8th ed., rev. 2, 2004) [hereinafter
MPEP]. The MPEP is published to provide USPTO patent examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents
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The USPTO issues nearly 200,000 patents annually. 21 In the twenty-two years
during which the law has provided for director-ordered reexaminations,
approximately 6,800 reexamination requests have been made, but only 157 (two
percent) were ordered sua sponte by the Director (or his previous equivalent the
commissioner).22 Recently, USPTO officials ordered the reexamination of two highly
publicized patents. They claimed that their authority to order the reexaminations
resulted from the substantial outcry that ensued in response to the USPTO's
23
allowing the patents to issue.
Section I discusses the options an independent inventor has to enforce a patent,
and why the reexamination procedure is crucial to independent inventors. Section II
provides the background to the patent reexamination practice and discusses
problems with that process. Section I1 provides an overview of current cases
involving director-ordered patent reexaminations. Section IV discusses the problems
with director-ordered reexaminations, and Section V proposes solutions to those
problems which include appointing the Director from within the USPTO, government
funding for USPTO employee's salaries, reevaluation of whether the procedures the
USPTO uses to order reexaminations follow the statute and making order by the
Director for reexamination immediately appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences.

I. BACKGROUND TO THE REEXAMINATION PROCESS

A. The History ofPatentReexamination
As a result of the growing number of patents held invalid based upon prior art,
Congress enacted the 1980 Reexamination Act (which permits ex parte
reexamination).24 The exparte process of patent reexamination provides a low-cost
25
means of resolving certain questions of validity as an alternative to litigation.
and representatives of applicants with reference to practices and procedures relative to prosecution
of patent applications before the USPTO. Id. at Foreward. The MPEP contains instructions for
patent examiners, as well as other material in the nature of information and interpretation, and
outlines the current procedures which patent examiners are required or authorized to follow during
appropriate cases in the examination of a patent application. Id. The MPEP has the force of neither
law nor rules. Id.
21 Jonathan

Krim, 'Outcry' TriggersRare PatentReview, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at E2.
Sean A. Passino et al., Reexaminations are Ordered Due to Public Outcry" In Two
Instances, the CommissionerRelied on Old Standardin New Way, NAT'LL. J. May 10, 2004, at S2.
23 Id.
24 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-308; see also Stuart J.H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control. A
22

Comparison of US. PatentReexaminations and European Patent Oppositions, 2-3 (Nov. 2, 2002),
available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/bhhall/papers/GHHM / 20NovO2.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004). The Reexamination Act parallels the post-grant opposition procedure found in the European
patent system. Id.
25 See Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is it Time for Corrective
Surgery, or is it Time to Amputates 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 245-46
(2003); Gerald J. Mossinghoff et al., Post-Grant Review of Patents.*Enhancing the Quality of the
Fuel of Interest,85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 231, 235-36 (2003).
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However, the reexamination process did not function as Congress intended. 26
Third parties (persons who are neither the patentee nor a representative of the
USPTO) generally did not use exparte reexamination because it was too one-sided.
The patent owner almost always prevailed and emerged in a stronger position to sue
the third party. 27 The system was also criticized as being biased in favor of patent
owners because third parties were allowed only minimal participation. 28 In response
to that criticism, Congress enacted inter partes reexamination as part of the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.29 Although inter partes reexamination
offers third parties greater participation in reexamination procedures, it also imposes
30
upon them severe estoppel and appeal repercussions.

B. The Interaction Between the Courts and the USPTO
The patent office examines patent applications and grants patents, which are
then enforced or challenged in federal court. 31 A patent application is reviewed by an
examiner at the USPTO after it is filed.3 2 If the application receives a final rejection,

the applicant can appeal to the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI").33 If the applicant is not satisfied with the result at the BPAI, it can either
sue in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia3 4 ("DDC") to compel the
26

See Dale L. Carlson & Jason Crain, Speech: Reexamination:A Viable Alternative to Patent

Litigation, 3 YALE SYmP. L. & TECH. 2, 3-4 (2000).

27 Id. at 3 (due to the structure of exparte reexamination it is widely believed that the process
is a way for the patentee to "take [a patent] that was invalid, in view of the [I prior art, and
infringed but the 3rd party, and end up with a patent that is valid and still infringed by [that] third
party").
28 Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2000) (setting forth the procedure for exparte reexamination
which is very similar to the prosecution process).
29 See generally American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
'3035 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2000). The third-party requester is permitted to file a response to
each statement filed by the patentee throughout the entire reexamination process. Id. § 314(b)(2).
A patent owner can appeal an adverse decision by the examiner to the USPTO Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) and if unsuccessful there, to the Federal Circuit. Id. § 315(a). The
third-party requester in interpartesreexamination can only appeal an adverse decision as far as
BPAI. Id. § 315(b)-(c). If the patentee appeals to the Federal Circuit, the third-party requester
cannot participate. -d. Furthermore, a third-party requester is prevented from raising the same
validity issues in any subsequent litigation of the patent in federal court. Id.
31 MUELLER, supra note 5, at 30. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
'32 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2000).
33 The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is an administrative body within the USPTO
that hears appeals from patent examiners' decisions in refusals to grant patents, ex parte patent
examination, ex parte and inter partes reexamination proceedings, interferences, and refusals to
reissue patents. I-d. §§ 6, 306, 315. The board is comprised of the Director, Commissioner for
Patents, Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. -d. §§ 6, 134.
"3 -d. § 145. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears appeals from decisions of the
DDC in civil actions to obtain a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 145 and in civil actions of interference
under 35 U.S.C § 146. I-d. § 146. Parties who have lost an interference or had their claims rejected
by the USPTO in exparte prosecution can bring a lawsuit against the Director of the agency at the
DDC. Id. § 306. Should the plaintiff prevail, the DDC will issue an order authorizing the USPTO to
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office to issue the patent or appeal directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
35
Federal Circuit ("CAFC").
Upon issuance of a patent, the patentee can enforce it through civil litigation in
federal district court, or a potential infringer may seek a declaratory judgment. 36 In
either case, appeals can be taken to the CAFC and, from there, possibly to the United
37
States Supreme Court.
In the situation where a federal court has ruled on the merits of a patent, but
reexamination is still an option under the guidelines, the federal court decision will
38
be considered controlling with respect to those claims held invalid by the court.
Where a reexamination of a patent in litigation has already commenced, courts may
stay proceedings to await the reexamination results.

39

A stay often leads to

simplification of the litigation due to the cancellation, clarification or limitation of
40
claims by the re-examiner.

C Reexamination can Help Independent Inventors Enforce Patents
Historically, the most important inventions have come from independent
inventors. 41 While an estimated three to five percent of all patents are infringed,

issue a patent. The advantage of using this procedural route is that the plaintiff can put new
evidence before the DDC that was not considered by the USPTO; see MUELLER, supra note 5, at 34.
New evidence cannot be presented on a direct appeal to the CAFC because evidence for direct
appeals must be on the record that was before the USPTO. 35 U.S.C. § 144.
35 Id. § 141. Prior to 1982, patent appeals were taken to the appropriate federal regional
circuit court of appeals; see MUELLER, supra note 5, at 32. Concerns over forum-shopping and lack
of national uniformity in patent law prompted Congress in 1982 to create the CAFC, a new appellate
court. Id.
'3628 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). A declaratory judgment action is an action initiated by an accused
infringer against a patentee seeking a declaration from a federal district court that he does not
infringe the patent in suit and/or that the patent is invalid and/or unenforceable. Id. Before a
declaratory judgment action can be filed, the accused infringer/declaratory plaintiff (1) must have a
reasonable apprehension of being sued for patent infringement, and (2) must be engaging in present
activity which could constitute infringement or must have taken concrete steps with the intent to
conduct such activity. Id.
37Id.§ 141.

38 37 C.F.R. § 1.565 (2004); see also MPEP, supranote 20, § 2286.
'9 The patentee in inter partes reexamination can request a stay of federal court litigation
which can only be denied if the court "determines that a stay would not serve the interests of
justice." 35 U.S.C. § 318. For ex parte reexamination, a stay is entirely in the discretion of the
federal district court; see Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
40 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1426 (explaining that reexamination can help eliminate the trial of
patent claim validity or at the very least provide the court with the expert examiner's opinion
thereto).
1 See generally, Dr. David L. Hill, Testimony Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm.
on
Courts
and
Intell.
Prop.
(Feb.
26,
1997),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/4129.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) (quoting Daniel Hamberg,
Invention in the IndustrialResearch Laboratory, 71 J. POL. ECON. 95, 96 (1963) (noting that in
1958, Professor John Jewkes showed that out of 61 important inventions and innovations of the 20th
century, which the authors selected for analysis, over half of them stemmed from independent or
small entity inventors)).
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only a small fraction of these are ever enforced by the patentee. 42 The patentee has
two primary options to protect his patent rights. The patentee can enforce his rights
by suing infringers, or by selling some or all of the rights to another via license or
assignment agreements.43 However, individual patent owners generally are unable
to license on their own because they lack licensing expertise, resources and
credibility. 44 In addition, the cost of negotiating a license agreement and enforcing
patent rights poses a formidable barrier to the average patentee which results in a
decrease of the value of the investment in his patent. 45 Knowing that the average
patentee does not have the required knowledge or financial backing and that very
few patents are enforced, large-company infringers often take a calculated risk and
blatantly ignore patent rights. 46 This is particularly problematic for independent and
small entity inventors because they do not have the ability to either dedicate the
resources necessary to identify and pursue licensing opportunities or wage costly
47
battles over their patent rights in district court.
An alternative is to have the patentee strengthen his patent rights via
reexamination. Reexamination reconfirms the presumed validity of the patent over
the prior art cited by the requestor without the expense of litigation. 48 The current
reexamination process allows a USPTO official to order patent reexamination based
upon public disapproval of the patent. 49 This backdoor policy is tenuous and easily
abused. 50
Therefore, perhaps the reexamination process itself needs to be
reexamined.

D. Directorsof the USPTO and Director-OrderedReexaminations
Although rooted in the United States Constitution, 51 the American patent
system was founded under the Patent Act of 1790.52 Under this act, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney General constituted a board which
42 Passino, supra note 22, at S2. A patentee is the owner of a patent; the entity holding legal
title in the patent. MUELLER, supranote 5, at 376. A patentee includes not only the person to whom
the patent was issued, but also his successors in title. Id. The patentee is not necessarily the same
entity as the inventor of the patented invention. Id.
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (setting forth what constitutes infringement of a patent); 35 U.S.C. §
261 (in addition patent rights are assignable).
See generally TechSearch,
Why Use TeehSearh
at http://www.techsearchllc.com/why.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004) [hereinafter TechSearch] (explaining the reasons that a
patent holder would want to use the services of a patent licensing firm-specifically TechSearch).
45

Id.

46 Id. Copying is evidence of willful infringement; see Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
47See TechSearch, supra note 44.
48MUELLER, supra note 5, at 214.
49See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).

M See Passino, supra note 22, at S2 (arguing that by using a public outcry standard the
USPTO is opening the door to allowing the losers in trial court to force the patentees into lengthy
reexamination).
51 Congress has the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52 See generallyPatentAct of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
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considered all applications for patents. 53 Today, that board is an administrative
body, the USPTO,which is part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 54 The Director
of the USPTO is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Reexamination can be requested by anyone based on any previously submitted
prior art or prior art that is cited in the request. 55

Within three months of the

request, the Director will determine whether "a substantial new question of
patentability" is raised as to any claim in the patent. 56 If a substantial question of
patentability is raised by the patents, a reexamination order is made. The order for
57
reexamination is not appealable until the reexamination is complete.
Additionally, the MPEP permits a USPTO employee to suggest a reexamination.
When a USPTO employee becomes aware of an "unusual fact situation 58 in a patent,
which he considers to clearly warrant reexamination, he can prepare a memorandum
setting forth such facts. 59 This memorandum is then submitted to the Office of the
60
If
Patent Legal Administration ("OPLA") through a supervisory chain of command.
53 See William I. Wyman, The Patent Office and Invention Since 1845- How the Government
Has Kept Pace With the Inventor, 112 Sci. Am.533, 533 (June 5, 1915). Thomas Jefferson, the first
Secretary of State, was the first Commissioner of Patents and the first Patent Examiner. Id. It is
said that Thomas Jefferson personally examined and determined the patentability of every
application filed during his first years in office as head of the State Department. Id. The grant of a
patent was not only a procedure of exceeding dignity, being signed by the President, the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General, but was issued with some reluctance. Id. Only three patents were
issued in 1790. Id.
54 35 U.S.C. § 3 (2000); see also Michael Felton, The PatentMachine --In Go Appleations, Out
Come Patents or Rejections, but What's Inside
PATS. & PROP. (Sept. 2001), at
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/iO9/html/O9patents.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
In the past, the USPTO fell under different jurisdictions such as the State Department and the
Department of the Interior. Id.
, 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
56 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000) (stating that the Director can consider any patents or publications
to determine whether there exists a substantial new question of patentability exists); e MPEP,
supra note 20, § 2242 (requiring prior art patents or printed publications to be reviewed and a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider them important to be present,
prior to making a determination of whether reexamination should be ordered). A prior art patent or
printed publication raises a substantial question of patentability where there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider the prior art patent or printed publication
important in deciding whether or not the claim is patentable. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2000). The existence
of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed
publication was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
Once it becomes apparent that there is no new question of patentability, it is improper to conduct a
reexamination. In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also In re
Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
57 See gonerallyJoyMfg. Co. v. Nat'l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Heinl
v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593 (D. Va. 2001); Patlex Corp. v. Quigg, 680 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1988);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 303.
,8MPEP, supra note 20, § 1003, No. 17 (providing that an "unusual fact situation" is present in
reviewing the patent, prosecution history and prior art if two conditions are met: (1) there is a
"compelling reason" to order reexamination and (2) at least one claim in a patent is prima facie
unpatentable over prior patents or printed publications).
59 Id. § 2239. The employee must include a proposed rejection of all appropriate claims, the
patent file, and any prior art with the memorandum. Id.
(3o Id.
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approved for reexamination, the OLPA prepares a decision that is signed by the
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy and the patent is then
61
reexamined.
In addition, the Director can, at any time, sua sponte determine whether a
substantial new question of patentability is raised by any submitted prior art or
other prior art discovered by him. 62 Director-ordered reexaminations are rare and
traditionally have been issued only for overly-broad patents. 63 The MPEP states that
director-ordered reexaminations will be initiated on a very limited basis, such as
where a general pubic policy question is at issue and there is no interest by any other
person.64 Normally, requests from outside the USPTO urging the Director to
65
undertake reexamination on his own initiative are not considered.
However, the MPEP notes that, in practice, the decision to order reexamination
at the Director's initiative is normally made by the Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examination Policy

66

after a review of all the facts concerning the patent.6 7

The

MPEP also states that the order for reexamination may be made by the Director, the
68
Deputy Director for Patents, or the Commissioner for Patents.

II. RECENT DIRECTOR-ORDERED REEXAMINATIONS
Two recent reexaminations of high profile patents ordered by high ranking
USPTO officials have created controversy among patent practitioners. Each case
demonstrates different reasons Directors should not be given the power to sua sponte
order reexaminations. In both cases, after trial but before completion of the judicial
process, sua sponte reexaminations were ordered by the Deputy Commissioner for

61 USPTO Organizational Structure, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/offices.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004). The Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy is one of three
deputy commissioners under the Commissioner for Patents. The Commissioner for Patents is
appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(2)(A) (2000). Although not defined
anywhere for reference, previous reexamination orders have stated that a "compelling reason"
includes circumstances where "a significant concern about the patentability of the claimed subject
matter has been expressed by a substantial segment of the industry andor there is substantial
media publicity adverse to the patent alleging conspicuous unpatentability of the claims." U.S. Pat.
Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,831 (declared Oct. 30, 2003).
(3 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
63 Patent ]ieexam. Hearings, supra note 19, at 16. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No.
90/006,289 (May 21, 2002) (method of swinging on a swing); U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,068
(Aug. 20, 2001) (painting kit and related method); U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,067 (Aug. 20,
2001) (method and system for measuring leadership effectiveness); U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No.
90/005,622 (ordered Mar. 3, 2000) (apparatus for and the method of automatically downloading and
storing internet web pages); U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/005,592 (Dec. 21, 1999) (date
formatting and sorting for dates spanning the turn of the century); U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No.
90/004,669 (July 15, 1997) (storm alert for emergencies, ordered by commissioner).
(4 See MPEP, supra note 20, § 2239.
65 37 C.F.R § 1.520 (2000). See alsoMPEP,supranote 20, § 2239.
66 See USPTO OrganizationalStructure, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/offices.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004).
67 MPEP, supra note 20, § 2239.
(38Id.
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Patent Examination Policy (as opposed to the Director) in parallel with the normal69
but incomplete-judicial processes.

A. Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation
While at the University of California, Michael Doyle, an employee of Eolas
Technologies ("Eolas") and inventor, obtained U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 (the '906
patent),70 which disclosed a method of sending interactive software applications over
the Internet.7 1 Eolas brought a patent infringement action against Microsoft
Corporation for infringing the '906 patent.7 2 Eolas alleged Microsoft began using the
technology in its Web browser soon after the patent was filed and continued to use it
after the patent issued in 1998. 73 Eolas claimed that a license had been offered to
Microsoft but the offer was declined.7 4 Microsoft defended by alleging inequitable
conduct 7 5 by Doyle for withholding information from the USPTO7 6 Microsoft based
this defense on their belief that Doyle had material information in its possession
during the prosecution of the '906 patent that it failed to disclose to the USPTO77 At
trial, Microsoft did not succeed in its inequitable conduct defense because there was
not enough evidence to prove intent to deceive the USPTO as required under the
doctrine of inequitable conduct.78 On August 11, 2003, the jury awarded Eolas 521
79
million dollars in damages for Microsoft's infringement of the '906 patent.

69 While the patents were being reexamined, appeals to the CAFC were filed in both cases. See
U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,491-5 (ordered Dec. 26, 2003) (appeal pending NTP Inc. v.
Research in Motion Ltd., No. 03-1615 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); U.S. Pat. Reexam Serial No. 90/006,831
(ordered by Director Oct. 30, 2003) (appeal pending Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 041234 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
70 Patents are abbreviated by using the last three digits of the number assigned by the USPTO,
hence the '906 patent. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 82 n.13 (3d ed. 2004).
71Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2000 WL 1898853, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
29, 2000) (Markmanhearing determination).
27See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(opinion of the court regarding partial summary judgment).
73Id.
71Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2003 WL 1903989, at *1 (N.D. 111.
Apr.
17, 2003) (courts denial of partial summary judgment regarding willful infringement).
75Inequitable conduct is committed when information material to patentability is withheld or
false material information is supplied to the USPTO with the intent to deceive. See Jay P. Kesan &
Marc Banik, Re-Engineoring Patent Law: The Challenge of Now Technologies: Part J.
Administrative Law Issues: Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D
Investment with Incentives to Disclose PriorArt, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23, 39 (2000); see also 37
C.F.R. § 1.56 (2004) (setting forth the inventors duty to disclose).
76 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2003 WL 22078029, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
3, 2003).
77 Id
7sId. at *9.
79World Wide Web Consortium's Citation of Prior Art under 35 U.S.C. § 301 AND 37 C.F.R. §
1.501 in Relation to U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906 at 1, U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,831
(ordered Oct. 30, 2003), available at http://www.w3.org/2003/10/301-filing.html; see also CardBeckles, supra note 72, at 6 (the jury's special verdict awarded Eolas $521 million based on a
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In October 2003, the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") announced that it
was seeking a reexamination of the Eolas patent because it threatened to undermine
the smooth operation of the Internet.8 0 The Director of the W3C, Tim Berners-Lee,
sent a letter to the USPTO requesting a director-ordered ex parte reexamination of
the '906 patent. Berners-Lee cited his own prior writings and that of software
developer Dave Raggett, which according to W3C constituted prior art.8 1 Citing the
request by Berners-Lee, on October 30, 2003, the USPTO Deputy Commissioner for
Patent Examination Policy, Stephen G. Kunin, initiated a reexamination of the Eolas
patent.8 2 The Deputy Commissioner claimed his authority to impose a reexamination
originated in the MPEP standard that USPTO employees use to notify USPTO
officials of an unusual fact pattern in a patent. The Deputy Commissioner's
"compelling reason"-as
required by the MPEP for the USPTO to suggest
reexamination based on an unusual fact situation-was "a substantial outcry from a
widespread segment of the . . . industry."8 3 According to the order, this outcry
created an extraordinary situation for which a director-ordered reexamination was
84
the appropriate remedy.
It has been suggested that the leaders of the USPTO have opened the door to a
pre-appeal reexamination that disrupts the judicial system.8 5 This disruption is
caused by the USPTO undertaking the reexamination of the '906 patent at the same
time as its validity is examined in a federal district court.8 6 The decision to order the
reasonable royalty of $1.47 per unit of the more than 354 million copies of Microsoft's Windows Webenabled operating system sold).
80 World Wide Web Consortium's Citation of Prior Art under 35 U.S.C. § 301 AND 37 C.F.R. §
1.501 in Relation to U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906, supra note 79, at 1.
81 Id. In addition to this request, the Director of the W3C sent a letter to the Director of the
USPTO stating that:
[W]e urge you to initiate a reexamination of the '906 patent in order to prevent
substantial economic and technical damage to the operation of World Wide Web.
As a result of a recent infringement judgment against Microsoft Corporation
based on the '906 patent, they have stated publicly that they intend to redesign
the Internet Explorer browser to avoid infringing the '906 patent. Although
Microsoft's proposed redesign covers only a small portion of its entire browser
program, it would render millions of Web pages and many products of
independent software developers incompatible with Microsoft's product . . . the
practical impact of withholding unrestricted access to the patented technology
from use by the Web community will be to substantially impair the usability of
the Web for hundreds of millions of individuals in the United States and around
the world.
Letter from Tim Berners-Lee, Director, World Wide Web Consortium, to Hon. James E. Rogan,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property, Director, USPTO (Oct. 28, 2003), available
at http://www.w3.org/2003/10/27-rogan.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
82 See Director Initiated Order for Reexamination at 2, U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,
831 (ordered Oct. 30, 2003).
83 Id.
85 Passino, supra note 22, at S2 (arguing that this will lead losers at trial to file reexamination

requests to further draw out the litigation process).
86 Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1939, 1944 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The court denied
Microsoft's motion to suspend the final decision until the USPTO completed its reexamination of the
'906 patent arguing that to stay such proceeding when they are already well into the briefing period
would not be proper and would materially prejudice Eolas. Id. at 1945.
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reexamination of the Eolas patent goes against the general policy of the USPTO that
it will act in harmony with the courts and not 'relitigate' in a reexamination
proceeding an issue of patentability which has been resolved on the merits by a
federal court.8 7 Furthermore, the request for reexamination was not made properly
under the statute; the request 88 was initiated by the Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examining and Policy, not the Director. Notably, the request for reexamination was
made informally by Berners-Lee, citing his own work as prior art, which either was
not sent to the USPTO or not thought to warrant examination by the USPTO at least
until after the district court ruling. The '906 patent is currently undergoing
reexamination.8 9 Microsoft filed an appeal on June 3, 2004, arguing that U.S. Judge
James B. Zagel of the Northern District of Illinois "distorted the proceedings in a
profound and fundamental way" by improperly limiting evidence about the existence
of alleged prior art regarding an earlier browser. 90

B. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.
In January 2000, NTP, 91 a holding company, 92 contacted Research In Motion
("RIM"), the Canadian manufacturer of BlackBerry® handheld computers, to extend
an offer for RIM to license NTP's patents covering the use of radio frequency wireless
communications in electronic mail systems. 93 After RIM refused the license proposal,
NTP sued RIM in federal court and won a $53.7 million jury verdict in November
2002.94

Although the court found no compelling reason to deny NTP's motion for a
permanent injunction 95 preventing RIM from selling nine current BlackBerry®
models and their respective software, the court did find that RIM would be
irreparably injured if a stay was not granted. 96 The court stayed the permanent
injunction pending RIM's appeal to the CAFC.97

87 A final judicial holding of claim invalidity or unenforceability after all appeals have been
taken, is controlling on the USPTO; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.565 (2004); MPEP, supra note 20, § 2286. In
such cases, a substantial new question of patentability would not be present as to the claims finally
held invalid or unenforceable. MPEP, supra note 20, § 2242. A non-final holding of claim invalidity
or unenforceability will not be controlling on the question of whether a substantial new question of
patentability is present. Id.
88 See Director Initiated Order for Reexamination, supra note 82, at 9 (the order was signed by
the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy).
89See generally U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,831 (ordered Oct. 30, 2003).
90See Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (appeal pending).
91NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F.Supp.2d 423, 425 (E.D. Va. 2002).
92 A holding company is a company formed to control other companies, usually confining its
role to owning stock and supervising management. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 275 (7th ed. 1999).
93 The patents that were eventually found to be infringed by RIM are U.S. Pat. Nos.: 5,436,960,
5,438,611, 5,625,670, 5,631,946, 5,819,172 and 6,067,451. Soo NTP,Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d at 425-26.
94 NTP, 2003 WL 23100881, at *1. The final order issued an injunction enjoining RIM from
selling, using or importing its BlackBerry software devices in the United States. Id.
95 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 3:01CV767, 2003 WL 23100881, at *1
(E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003) (final order of the district court).

96Id.
97 Id.
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In late December 2002, the USPTO responded to concern about the NTP
decision from the telecommunications industry by commencing a director-ordered ex
parte reexamination of four NTP patents involved in the RIM litigation. 98 The
reexamination was premised upon "a drumbeat from the industry, more diverse than
just one company.' 99 These reexaminations are still pending.100
After the Director ordered reexamination of the NTP patents, Congress
unexpectedly entered the patent fray between RIM and NTP in January 2003. The
Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives, James Eagen III, sent
a letter to counsel for both parties advocating a resolution to the patent dispute that
did not halt RIM's operations. In this letter, Eagan stated that any disruption of the
RIM's service would "significantly impact the ability of the House to conduct its
business and maintain communications between members and staff."10 1 James
Wallace, attorney for NTP, said he could reach no other conclusion except that "[It
appears likely . . .that RIM stirred up the pot with the Congress and the patent
office." 10 2 Congressional officials said RIM did nothing to prompt the sending of the
letter.103

III. ANALYSIS
Many giant corporations have no need of a patent system .. .[They] would
be glad to compete on size, nationwide service, high volume, strong finance,
and prompt delivery. They can kill off smaller competitors on any of those
bases, unless the small competitor has a patent on a product someone wants
10 4
to buy.
As demonstrated above, big companies infringing small inventors' patents is not
news. However, a lone inventor wins a judgment against a big company is big
news.10 5 In fact, in the past few years, there have been a remarkable number of
lawsuits and judgments involving small inventors with sizable claims against large
corporations involving patent infringement, fraud and breach of contract. 106

98 J. Scott Orr, CongressEnters Struggle Over Blaekberry Patent,NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 2003, athttp://newhouse.live.advance.net/archive/orr022003.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
99 Id
100 Id.
101

Id.

The House has issued almost 3000 BlackBerry devices to House members and staff and

invested in over $6 million in the supporting proprietary technology. Id.
102 Id.
103

Id.

See Banner, supra note 1, at 10 (citing Howard T. Markey, Some Patent Problems Philosophical, Philological and Procedural, 80 F.R.D. 203, 210 (1978, 1979)).
104

105 See Ellen Paris, David v.Goliath - Inventors Invent. Big Companies Steal. And You Can't
Fightit Because You Don't Have the Money to Win - or Can You, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, Nov. 1999,

available at http://www.entrapreneur.com/mag/article/0%/2C15390/%2C2314190/o2COO.html
(last
visited Nov. 9, 2004) (presenting the dilemma of a small patent owner who is faced with the
daunting task of taking a big company to court to enforce his patent rights).
106 Hal Meyer, David Beats Goliath, PAT. CAFE MAGAZINE,
Dec. 15, 1997, at
http://www.cafezine.com/printable-template.asp?deptid=19&articleid=107 (last visited Nov. 9, 2004)
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Small inventors face substantial hurdles when bringing an enforcement action
against a giant corporation. First, independent inventors lack the financial resources
necessary to compete with a large corporation. 107 Independent inventors may win
large settlements against the large companies, but those same companies can in turn
force patentees into reexaminations that can take several years to complete (not
including the cost and time if there is an appeal), despite the "special dispatch"
provision.108 If independent inventors succeed in winning a large judgment in court,
the large companies at the other end of that verdict may attempt to convince the
Director or other USPTO officials to order the reexamination. 10 9 Furthermore, critics
argue that the United States is setting a bad example for the rest of the world
because other countries may follow suit and begin to order reexaminations in
response to industry requests.11 0

A. FinancingOptions for Small Entities with Limited FinancialResources
The rights which a patentee secures in his patent give him the right to exclude
others from his invention.11 1 An inventor can make a profit by licensing or assigning
his patent to another for a fee. 112 In addition, if the technology is highly desirable in
the marketplace, the inventor may choose to keep rights in the patent to himself and
become the sole producer of that desirable technology. 113 Generally a patent owner
will either use the patent to start a business (to sell the technology) or license rights
in the patent. 114 Both options have advantages and disadvantages. Licensing
requires minimal effort on the part of the inventor and gives the inventor money up
front. 115 Granting an exclusive license1 16 to a licensing firm greatly strengthens the
(setting forth several instances where inventors secured large verdicts against large corporations
similar to Eolas and RI.14.
107 Id.
108 See Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

In Ethicon, a suit brought by a
third party requester, the Commissioner's decision to stay a reexamination proceeding pending the
outcome of litigation in a district court was found to violate the statutory requirement that
reexamination proceedings be "conducted with special dispatch."
d.
Basically, once the
reexamination is commenced, the requester has a right to have a reexamination proceed, and the
district court has jurisdiction to adjudicate that right. Id.
109 See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). The decision to order reexamination at the Director's initiative
is normally made by the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy. MPEP, supra note
20, § 2239. However, it apparently may also be made by the Director, the Deputy Director or the
Commissioner for Patents. Id.
I10 See Passino, supra note 22, at 3.

1 1 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a).
See MPEP, supra note 20, § 301 (noting that a patentee may license or assign his rights in
the patent).
113 A patentee can choose to keep a true monopoly over the patented technology for up to
twenty years starting from the application filing date. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting forth the
patent protection term).
"I4See generally, Rorke, supra note 11, at 7 (recommending that patentees seek professional
assistance when negotiating patent licenses or assignments).
112

Id.
116 The exclusive license prevents the patent owner (or any other party to whom the patent

115

owner might wish to sell a license) from competing with the exclusive licensee, as to the geographic
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inventor's resources by putting teams of professionals to work at licensing or
enforcing the patent.1 17
Financial obstacles to the inventor may be of little
consequence to exclusive licensees either because they are in the sole business of
enforcing patents or because they simply are in a better financial position to profit
from the patented technology.118 In addition, it is the responsibility of licensing firms
to find licensees.
They may perceive uses and explore markets that were not
anticipated by the inventor, thereby generating more income.1 19
Granting an
exclusive license also frees the inventor to pursue activities other than enforcing his
120
patent rights or seeking licensees.
However, licensing has limitations. First, the independent inventor may not
find an exclusive licensee. Second, by granting an exclusive license, the independent
inventor loses control over the technology, reducing the inventor's involvement in his
patent. 121 Any further licensing and enforcement is then left to the excusive licensee.
Conversely, the inventor may start a business in order to keep control of his
invention and profits. 122
The most significant disadvantage to starting a new
business is that many new businesses fail. 123 Common reasons for business failure
include inadequate financing, poor business judgment, and poor management
125
skills.1 2 4 Oftentimes the inventor's time and money are quickly exhausted.
Ideally corporations should be scared of patent holders. A patentee should be
viewed as a technology giant, whose vengeance can crush a corporation for infringing
its patents. 126 Currently, this is not the case. Many patents that are infringed are
never enforced and large corporations take advantage of this fact.
However,
independent inventors can use patent licensing firms to maximize their patent
rights. Licensing firms have the business, technical and legal experience necessary
to negotiate licenses and to initiate lawsuits against potential infringers. 127 As such,
when working with a licensing firm the independent or small entity inventor at least
ensures that large corporations will understand that infringement will not be
tolerated absent consequences.
Furthermore, licensing firms have the financial
resources to underwrite the costs associated with civil lawsuits, including legal
expenses. 128 A licensing firm's purported purpose is to help independent and small
129
entity inventors maximize their rights in their inventions.

region, the length of time, and/or the field of use, set forth in the license agreement. See 35 U.S.C. §
261 (rights in a patent are assignable); see also MPEP, supra,note 20, §301.
117 See Rorke, supra note 11, at 7.
118 Td.
119 Id.

120

Id.

121 Id.

(setting forth that often times the inventor may lose total control of his technology for a
long period of time, even perhaps forever).
122 Id. at 8.
123 Id. (listing a number of disadvantages to starting your own business).
121Id.

Id.
Commissioner Conway P. Coe, Temporary National Economic Committee Hearings - Part
III, at 856 (1939), reprintedin Banner, supra note 1, at 9.
127 Id.
128 Id.
125

126

129

Id.
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B. The USPTO: Authority of the Directorand Other USPTO Officials
In 1991, the USPTO was cut off from general tax revenues and required to
subsist entirely on fees 130 for its operating budget.131 The argument for this change
was that inventors should directly pay for the USPTO's services because they used
those government services to acquire a limited monopoly on their inventions. 132 By
subsisting only on patent fees, examiners know that their year-end bonuses depend
on productivity. 133 This may cause examiners to treat small entities, 134 which pay
lower fees, differently than large entities.
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 gave the USPTO more
managerial freedom by converting the office into a performance-based
organization. 135 As a result, its management has been promoted and now receives
bonuses for meeting office goals. 136 Moreover, the organization has greater freedom in
hiring personnel and purchasing supplies and services. 137 USPTO officials now
measure performance in terms of their output. The result is that the USPTO
operates as if it were a manufacturing company turning out product by processing
138
patent applications.

130

FY2005 Fee Schedule, supra note 6. By statute, the USPTO is authorized to grant a patent

when an applicant satisfies certain requirements, including the payment of appropriate fees. 37
C.F.R §§ 1.16-1.19 (2004). Additionally, throughout the life of the patent, the USPTO requires the
patent holder to periodically pay maintenance fees. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2004).
1:31James Gleick, Patently Absurd- Part2."Big vs. Small, Politics Out of Joint, N.Y. Times,
March 12, 2000, 44 (Magazine), at 47. However, each year the administration and Congress
appropriate only a portion of these fees to the next year's USPTO budget, using the balance to fund
other government projects. Id.
132

Id.

1:3:3Id.

As pointed out by then Commissioner of Patents W.E. Simonds, even in 1892 the
political ties of the patent office where a concern:
[t]he Patent Office is no more political in its nature than is a well-regulated court
of law, and it would be just as reasonable to appoint and remove the judges of the
Federal courts on a political basis as it is to do that same thing by the
Commissioner of Patents. The fortunes of a political party cannot be advanced or
retarded by what is done in the Patent Office. It is a business office, in close touch
with the business interests of the country, and everything in and about it should
proceed upon a business basis.
W. E. Simonds, 1892 ANN. REP. FOR THE COMMISSIONER OF PATS. vi.
134 See Goepel, supra note 10.
1:35As a performance-based organization, the USPTO is committed to accountability by having
clear objectives, specific measurable goals, customer service standards, and targets for improved
performance. See Richard Maulsby, USPTO Becomes Performance-Based Organization, USPTO
TODAY, Spring 2000, at 6. In exchange for its commitment to accountability, the USPTO has been
granted new managerial flexability such as autonomy over the budget, hiring and procurement. Id.
at 7.
Such flexability will enable the USPTO to operate more like a business than the
administrative office that it is. Id.
1:36See Patent Reform Legislation Becomes Law, RADIO FREE PTO (Pat. Office Profl Ass'n,
Washington D.C.) Dec. 1999-Jan. 2000, at http://www.popa.org/newsletters/decjan99.shtml (last
visited Nov. 9, 2004).
1:37Maulsby, supra note 135, at6.

138 See Gleick, supra note 131, at 47.
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In turn, officials treat their large-entity fee-paying patent applicants as their
customers: "the more the better."139 The boost in the drive to push more patents
through the USPTO means officials are more inclined to listen to their higher-paying
customers' complaints about so-called overly-broad patents granted to independent
inventors. 140
It is complaints such as these that can prompt director-ordered
reexaminations. 141

The Director is responsible for providing policy direction and management
supervision for the USPTO and for the issuance of patents and registration of
trademarks. 142 The Director is supposed to perform his duties fairly, impartially and
equitably. 143 This being said, past directors of the USPTO often have been criticized
for their abuse of authority within the USPTO.144 This abuse of authority is
146
exemplified in the cases of ExparteAkamatsu 145 and ExparteAlappat.
In Ex parte Akamatsu, the patent examiner rejected claims as unpatentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.147 The original BPAI panel reversed this
rejection. However, the BPAI chairman prevented the mailing of that decision and
formed a special second panel consisting only of politically elected USPTO
management officials.148 The new panel overruled the first BPAI decision and upheld
the examiner's original rejection, making no mention of the earlier, contrary decision
in their written opinion.149

139

Id.

See generally, Simonds, supra note 133, at vi.

Ahead of his time, in 1893 then

Commissioner Simonds noted the possibility of this danger explaining that:
[t]he appointment of the Commissioner of Patents and the Assistant
Commissioner ought at once and forever to cease to be political, their salaries
should be increased, and they should hold office on the tenure of good behavior.
These positions are, first of all judicial in their nature. Unless the persons who
make these decisions have a previous training and education fitting them for
these judicial duties, their performances are but a cruel travesty of true judicial
action. Given fitness, it is still in the highest degree important that the lines
upon which these judicial decisions are rendered should be stable and certain and
not liable to change as the Office shifts from person to person at short intervals.
Id.
140
Gleick, supra note 131, at 46 (arguing that although small inventors can and do get the
patents, it is the big corporations that can afford to litigate them - hence - the big corporations win).
1I Id.; see J. Scott Orr, Congress Enters Struggle Over BlackberryPatent,NEWHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE, Feb. 2003, at http://newhouse.live.advance.net/archive/orr022003.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2004); Matt Hicks, W3C Seeks Re-examination ofEolas Browser Patent,EWEEK.COM, Oct. 29, 2003,
at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1490613,00.asp(last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
112 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2000).
143 Id.
"I See Jeffrey W. Rennecker, Ex Parte Appellate Procedure in the Patent Office and the
FederalCircuit'sRespective StandardsofReview, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (Spring 1996).
145 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Pat. App.1992).
116

23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Pat. App.1992), revd, 33 F.3d 1526, (Fed. Cir. 1994).

For

consistency in this comment, in discussing both ExparteAkamatsu and Exparte Alappat, the word
"commissioner" has been changed to "director" to reflect new USPTO titles.
See generally,
Chartrand, supra note 17.
1722 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
11 See Rennecker, supra note 144, at 338; Alan L. Koller, Ph.D., J.D., The Role of the Patent
Commissionerin DesignatingPanels from the Board of PatentAppeals and Interferences, 34 IDEA
185, 186 (1994) (arguing that the commissioner manipulated the panels to get a desired outcome).
149 See Rennecker, supra note 144, at 375-76.
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In Ex parte Alappat, the examiner also rejected claims as unpatentable, nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.150 This time, a panel of three
examiners-in-chief designated by the Director reversed the examiner's rejection. In
response, the original examiner, arguing that the panel's decision conflicted with
USPTO policy, requested reconsideration of the panel decision by a new expanded
panel. 151 A new panel was formed, this time with eight members, including the five
USPTO management officials who were members of the second panel in Ex parte
Akamatsu, discussed above.
The five administrative members of the newly
constituted panel then issued a majority opinion affirming the examiner's § 101
rejection, thus overturning the original panel's decision. 152 The three examiners-inchief who formed the original panel dissented for the same reasons as in their earlier
153
opinion.
The decisions in Akamatsu and Alappat both resulted in considerable debate
throughout the patent community. Several examiners-in-chief sent memoranda to
the Director complaining that he was pre-deciding cases and then designating or
"stacking" the BPAI panels to achieve a desired outcome. 154 Members of the bar also
expressed concern over the Director's role in setting USPTO policy through the
adjudications of the BPAI. 155 Additionally, aside from forcing Akamatsu and Alappat
to endure additional costs, time and frustration, the examiners-in-chief expressed
their concern that the Director had frustrated and offended the Board by impinging
upon its independence. 156 In turn, the Director prepared a memorandum in defense
1 57
of his exercises of authority over the Board.
As a result of the uproar, the CAFC reviewed Ex Parte Alappat en banc to
address these issues. 158 The court held that the Director had the authority to form a
second panel for reconsideration of an initial panel decision under 35 U.S.C. § 7.159
The CAFC further held that legislative history did not demonstrate that Congress
150 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
151 See Rennecker,

supra note 144, at 376.

id.
15: Soo id.
154 See id. at 338 (recounting that the Director, unsatisfied with the determination of the first
152 Soe

BPAI panel as it purportedly conflicted with USPTO policy, requested reconsideration by an

expanded BPAI panel with eight members-which was granted).
155 Soo id. (noting the Director's selection of the new members of the eight member BPAI panel
apparently turned on their concurrence with his view of the proper outcome of the case).
156 See id.
517 In
a Commissioner's Memorandum to the Members of the BPAI of April 29, 1992,
Commissioner Harry Manbeck and Deputy Commissioner Douglas Comer replied:
[i]n a particular case, the Commissioner may deem it appropriate to establish
legal policy for the Patent and Trademark Office, which he believes to be
consistent with the applicable law, through entry of a decision by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences. There is no limitation in the statute as to
when the members of a panel may be designated. Hence, at any time prior to
entry of a decision by the Board, the Commissioner may designate, or redesignate, a panel.

Harry Manbeck, Corrospondeneo Between Board Members and PTO Commissioner on Board
Independence, 44 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 43 (May 14, 1992).
158 Exparte Kuriappan P. Alappat et al., 33 F.3d 1526, 1531-31 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Rennecker,
supra note 144, at 339.
159 Expa-rte Kuriappan P. Alappat et al., 33 F.3d at 1533, 1534.
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intended to impose any limitations on the Director's designation practices. 160
Although the court reversed the decision of the second BPAI panel,161 holding
Alappat's patent was within the patentable subject matter guidelines of 35 U.S.C. §
101, the CAFC ultimately concluded that the Director's actions were a valid exercise
162
of his powers.

C The Director-OrderedReexamination Procedure
The procedure for a Director's sua sponte ordering of an ex parte patent
reexamination has been abused. Any person is allowed to present the USPTO with
163
prior art that the person believes to have some bearing on the validity of a patent.
The prior art will become part of the official patent file if the person citing the prior
art explains in writing its importance. 164 Any person is allowed to file a request for
reexamination of any patent claim based on this cited prior art. 165 Therefore, § 301
allows for submission of prior art to the patent office so that anyone else (e.g., a
USPTO employee or member of the public) can request reexamination, while § 302
takes § 301 one step further and allows anyone to request reexamination.
The Director may, upon his own initiative, look at the patent in question with or
without consideration of other documents or a formal request for reexamination as
required under § 302.166 The Director can then determine whether a substantial new
question of patentability is raised by the prior art submitted in the request. 167 The
Director is permitted to initiate reexamination proceedings even though no request
for reexamination has been filed. 168 An order by the Director that no substantial new
question of patentability exists is both final and not appealable. 169 A finding by the
Director that a substantial new question of patentability does exist results in a
reexamination proceeding. This finding is not appealable until the reexamination is
complete.

IV. PROPOSAL

The first part of this section proposes two solutions to the problems created by
the USPTO becoming a performance-based organization and having a director that is
politically appointed. The first proposed solution is to require that the salaries of
160

Id. at 1532.
1536.

161Id. at

162 Id. at 1536 (leaving open the question of whether Congress should act to legislatively limit
the power of the Commissioner to order such a rehearing and appoint the panel therefor).
163 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
164 Id.

165

35 U.S.C. § 302.

166 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
167 Id.
168 35

U.S.C. § 304.

109 See generally Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Heinl v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593 (D. Va. 2001); Patlex Corp. v. Quigg, 680 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C.
1988); see also 35 U.S.C. § 303.
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patent officials and examining personnel be funded by the government, while patent
filing fees be used for administrative costs and for improving the patenting process.
This would cease USPTO officials and examiners financial motivations to place a
high priority on large entity patents while lowering the costs to obtain and maintain
a patent. The second proposed solution is to have the Director of the USPTO
promoted from within the patent office with the additional requirement that he or
she have a set number of years of patent office experience. This solution would
ensure that the Director has a standard experience level and would help to ensure
that politics and large companies and not a primary loyalty for the Director's
decisions.
The second part of this section proposes solutions to the problem of the abuse of
authority that is occurring in the USPTO regarding sua sponte orders of
reexaminations. The first proposed solution is for the USPTO to simply follow the
rules prescribed by Congress. The Director of the USPTO should only be permitted
to order reexaminations when there is a general policy question at issue. The second
proposed solution is to allow director-ordered reexamination orders to be immediately
appealable to the BPAI. This solution would work to minimize influences from the
political arena and ensure that the Director has a check upon his authority before the
reexamination process commences.

A.

The Government Should Fund USPTO Examiners'andOfficials'Salariesand the
DirectorShould be Promotedfrom within the USPTO

USPTO examiners' and officials' wages should be funded by the government.
Performance-based systems often are abused by people whose only goal is to meet
quotas. 170 The same result is inevitable in the USPTO. The patent system is
supposed to reward invention and promote disclosure, thus stimulating further
innovation.171 Because the government inevitably benefits through the promotion of
science and the useful arts, it should contribute to the process and pay the
examiners' salaries. Necessarily, there will be administrative costs, such as those
associated with filing, storing, and keeping records of patents and patent
applications. Application fees should be applied to these costs.
Currently, the
USPTO is funded solely from user fees.17 2 Government funding of a portion of these
fees would lower the burden on independent and small entity inventors to fund the
costs of obtaining a patent, thus furthering the purpose of the patent system by
promoting the disclosure of ideas.173 This means less incentive for examiners to lend
an ear to their bank-rolling big corporate clients when it comes down to which
patents may warrant reexamination.
In addition, the Director should be required to have experience in both patents
and trademarks and be promoted from within the USPTO. This insures that the
Seo Gleick, supranote 131, at 47.
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (rehashing these three
constant principles of the patent system).
172 FY2005 Fee Schedule, supra note 6.
173 Soo Brian Kahin, Tho Expansion of the PatontSystom: Politics and tho PoliticalEconomy,
FIRST MONDAY, 2001, athttp://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6-l/kahin (last visited Nov. 9, 2004);
Felton, supra note 54.
170

171
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Director has a certain level of recent USPTO experience and politics are not overly
influential in the Director's decisions."l 4 Under 35 U.S.C § 3, the Director currently
is not required to be promoted from within the USPTO.175 Furthermore, the Director
is not required to have any experience in the USPTO, just a professional background
and experience in patent or trademark law. 176 In addition to the possibility that the
Director has absolutely no patent law background, the Director having mere
professional experience is a problem because it allows the Director to bring recent
1 7
personal experiences to his job which were developed outside of the USPTO. Y
From a reexamination standpoint, a director's personal experiences can greatly
impact whether there is a "substantial new question of patentability" as required by
the statute,17 8 especially when the appointment process is political. For example, the
Director may own stock in the company that is suggesting he sua sponte order a
patent reexamination. Alternatively, the Director may have previously worked or
litigated against the company requesting reexamination. These companies may have
political influence which could endanger the Director's appointment. To alleviate
this obvious conflict of interest, the Director should have several years experience
within the USPTO immediately before beginning his or her appointment as
Director. 179 The Director must be knowledgeable in both patents and trademarks.
Furthermore, promoting the Director from within the USPTO would help to
eliminate government influences over the patenting process because the Director's
position would then be more of a promotion than an appointment similar to any other
business. In addition, it would help to avoid situations such as those seen in RIM,
where it was suggested that a member of Congress may have influenced the
Director's decision to reexamine the NTP patents.

B. The USPTO Should Follow the Laws that CongressEstablishedby Clarifying
Authority andAbolishingAbuses Thereof
The USPTO should follow the laws that Congress has established.180 In order to
do so, problems must be recognized and remedied. The MPEP states that the
Director normally orders sua sponte reexaminations only when a general public
policy question is at issue and there is no interest by any other person but practice
has shown this not to be the case. 181 The USPTO plainly is not following the rules
Congress prescribed in 35 U.S.C. § 303. The decision to order reexamination at the
171As was seen in Eolas and RIM See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1090 (N.D. Ill. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 04-1234 (Fed. Cir. 2004); NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F.Supp.2d 423 (E.D. Va. 2002).
175 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2000).
176

177

Id.
Thomas Ewbank, 1851 ANN. REP. OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATS., pt. 1,

10

(the

Commissioner for patents in 1851 argued in proposing the structure of the USPTO that "the arts
and sciences have no affinities with and should not be linked to temporary politics").
178 See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
179 PatentReexam. Hearings,supra note 19, at 36.
180 The current powers and responsibilities of the office are distinctly defined by Congress and
set forth in Title 35. See 35 U.S.C. § 6.
1s
MPEP, supra note 20, § 2212. This was not the case in either NTPor Eolas. See generally,
supra, Section III. (A) & (B).
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Director's initiative normally is made by the Deputy Commissioner for Patent
Examination Policy. 8 2 In addition, whenever a USPTO official, other than the
Director, sua sponte orders an ex parte patent reexamination, his decision is based
upon the presence of an unusual fact situation in the patent, not a substantial new
question of patentability (the standard followed by the Director). Furthermore, when
citing the presence of an unusual fact situation, the USPTO employee ordering
reexamination can refer to significant concerns about the patentability of the claimed
subject matter as heard from industry or media which are publicity adverse to the
patent.183
First, anyone (including the Director) can request reexamination of an issued
patent based upon prior art.18 4 Second, most director-ordered reexaminations are
not, in practice, truly "director" ordered. 18 5 However, the statutes actually state that
only the Director can order such reexaminations. 18 6 In addition, other USPTO
officials have claimed to have authority to initiate reexaminations based upon a
different standard than that followed by the Director. 18 7 In order to initiate a proper
director-ordered reexamination, the Director must find that the prior art presented to
the USPTO in the reexamination request or any other prior art raises a substantial
18 8
new question of patentability.
There should not be a need for a USPTO employee or examiner to have a greater
reason (a prima facie unpatentable claim) to suggest that a patent be reexamined at
the request of the Director than that required of the Director (a substantial new
question of patentability).189 Furthermore, the "compelling reason" criterion allows
190
for the situation where a USPTO employee is influenced by industry or the media.
If correct about their patentability concerns, both the industry and the media should
be more than capable of supporting their claims and should either request
reexamination under § 302 or submit prior art under § 301 and pay the ex parte
reexamination fee. The duality of the standards is redundant and the current
practice under the MPEP should either be modified to meet the statute or
abandoned.
Elimination of reexaminations ordered by USPTO officials other than the
Director and limitation of director-ordered reexaminations to those prescribed by law
would help ensure the following: (1) reexamination fees are paid for each patent that
is reexamined; (2) prior art is submitted to the USPTO through the proper channels
proscribed by § 301 so that it becomes part of the patent file; and (3) the amount of
outside influence in deciding to reexamine a patent is minimized.

182See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000); ef MPEP § 2239.
183 See U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006,831 (declared Oct. 30, 2003) (stating the reason to

be a substantial outcry from the industry and media).

18 35 U.S.C. § 302.
185 See MPEP, supra note 20, § 2239; see, e.g., U.S. Pat. Reexam. Serial No. 90/006, 831 (the

Eolas reexamination was ordered by the Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy)

186 35 U.S.C. §§ 303-304 (2004).
187 See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (substantial question of patentability); ef MPEP, supra note 20, § 2239
(prima facie unpatentable).
188 35 U.S.C. § 303.
189 Id.; ef MPEP, supra note 20, § 2239.
190 Id.; see USPTO OrganizationalStructure, supra note 66.
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C Director-OrderedReexamination OrdersShould be
ImmediatelyAppealable to the BPAI
Orders for reexamination should be immediately appealable to the BPAI.
Currently, case law and the MPEP state that a sua sponte order for reexamination is
not immediately appealable even though the harm to the inventor could be
irreparable. 191 If the patentee is forced into reexamination, 192 the result is a costly
process which can take several years to complete and can result in delays in licensing
opportunities. Furthermore, there is no means for the patentee to confront an order
for reexamination. 193 Worse yet, it is possible that the reexamination was ordered
sua sponte by someone without the express statutory authority to do so. 19 4 As
opposed to an extensive reexamination, an immediate appeal would allow a patentee
confront (and explain away) the prior art cited in the order before beginning the
actual reexamination which could take several years to complete. 195 Furthermore, by
allowing the patentee to immediately challenge on appeal the Director's reasons for
ordering the reexamination, the process would comply more with the statutory notion
that patents are presumed to be valid. 196 By requiring that the appeal be
immediately heard by a panel of administrative judges there would be some
assurance for the inventor that the Director who initiated the reexamination did not
abuse his authority.

191 Case law has determined that a substantive determination by the Director to institute
reexamination is not subject to review by the courts until a final agency decision in the
reexamination proceeding has issued. See Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127,
1130 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Heinl v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593, 600 (D. Va. 2001) (noting that "there is
no provision granting us direct review" of the decision to institute a reexamination and that direct
review of reexamination decisions by the Board of Patent Appeals provides sufficient protection
against harassing and duplicative examinations); Patlex Corp. v. Quigg, 680 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.D.C.
1988); (noting that the Director's threshold determination merely triggers the reexamination
proceeding; it does not affect the validity of the patent).
192 The Administrative Procedure Act has been used unsuccessfully in the courts to attempt to
appeal an order for reexamination. Patlex Corp. v. Quigg, 680 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.D.C. 1988). The
Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of agency action unless such action is
"committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000). This discretionary procedure
applies whenever "congressional intent to preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in the detail
of the legislative scheme." Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984).
193 Although the Director, Commissioner for Patents, and Commissioner for Trademarks are
part of BPAI, and there is still the risk of a stacked panel, more people determining the existence of
a substantial new question of patentability would further validate such a finding. 35 U.S.C. § 6

(2000).
194Only in "appropriate circumstances" may a petition may be filed to vacate an ultra vires
reexamination order. 37 C.F.R. § 1.181(a)(3) (2004). "Appropriate circumstances" include: (1) when
the reexamination order is not based on prior patents or printed publications; (2) all claims of the
patent were held to be invalid by a final decision of a Federal Court; (3) reexamination was ordered
for the wrong patent; (4) reexamination was ordered based on a duplicate copy of the request; or (5)
the reexamination order is based wholly on prior art previously considered in an earlier concluded
examination of the patent by the Office (e.g., the application which matured into the patent, a prior
reexamination, an interference proceeding). MPEP, supra note 20, § 2246.
195 See generally, Passino, supra, note 22, at S2 (noting a reexamination can take, at times, up
to ten years to complete).
1')c 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
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V. CONCLUSION

Therefore, to avoid the many problems with the current reexamination
procedure, the USPTO should consider a comprehensive reevaluation of the process
on many levels. First, the decision to order a reexamination should be immediately
appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. In addition, the
Director should be promoted from within the USPTO to provide a solid background
for the position and protect the position from being overly political. On that same
note, funding for the USPTO should be underwritten by the government to ensure
that the political consequences of viewing patent applicants as customers do not
shade the impartiality of any examiners or USPTO officials. Furthermore, the
guidelines within the MPEP which refer to the procedure for initiating
reexaminations should be revised to coincide with the guidelines provided by
Congress in Title 35. In so doing, the USPTO and Congress ensure that the
independent or small entity inventor is not short changed by the patent process.
After all, it is the piece of paper we call a patent which protects even the smallest of
inventors and serves as the weapon used to shoot down even the greatest of
adversaries.

